Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

State of Utah v. Larry D. Person : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Mark R. Decaria;
Weber County Attorney; Attorney for Appellee.
Stephan A. Laker; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Person, No. 930059 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4946

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

I N THE UTAH!

couRtrllMtlllliPPEALS

i

1" f rii in in mm mil

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

LARRY D. PERSON

:

Case No. 930059-CA

:

Priority No.

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APiP'EiWffl
APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF A IjKlfriON FOR
MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT ?|p«lwIN6 A
CONVICTION FOR THEF+, A T H i m DEGREE FELONY,
PURSUANT TO UTAH COpE ANN. IIPW-6-404,
(1990), IN THE SECOND JUMCFIIKL DISTRICT
COURT, IN AND FOR W$BER COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL J. GLASMANN,
PRESIDING.

UTAH COU^T OF APPEAU
UT^f
n ~<t"' * / r > 7

K .; U

59
.A10

- MO 43005.1

A. BRONSTON (4470)
t Attorney General
(1231)
f'b'fney G e n e r a l
"|jkft|ate C a p i t o l
P l l a k e C i t y , U t a h 84114
Jfephone: (801) 5 3 8 - 1 0 2 2
JC R. DECARIA
e r County A t t o r n e y
a s h i n g t o n B l v d . , #700
U t a h 84401
[one: (801) 3 9 9 - 8 3 7 7
IHttilbineys f o r

Appellee

BlJk„.£RGIJMENT NOT REQUESTED

STEPHEN A. LAKER
Attorney for Appellant
2568 Washington Blvd, St 202
Ogden, Utah 84401

fcUL 2 3 1995
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 930059-CA

v.
Priority No. 2

LARRY D. PERSON
Defendant/Appellant

.BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR
MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT FOLLOWING A
CONVICTION FOR THEFT, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY,
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404,
(1990), IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL J. GLASMANN,
PRESIDING.

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
MARK R. DECARIA
Weber County Attorney
2547 Washington Blvd., #700
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 399-8377
Attorneys for Appellee
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

STEPHEN A. LAKER
Attorney for Appellant
2568 Washington Blvd, St 202
Ogden, Utah 84401

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

. . . 4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
POINT

DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESER'" *
IMM
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF C . w ^ . . .

5

II DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT HIS TRIAL
COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT
OR THAT, BUT FOR COUNSEL'S ALLEGED
ERRORS, THE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN
DIFFERENT

A.

B.

Trial Counsel's Acceptance of Defendant's
Prior Convictions, Without Apparent
Verification, was Reasonable

7

8

Defendant Has Not Shown That The
Result of the Proceeding Would Have
Been Different Had Counsel Obtained
Certification of the Prior Convic.-_.ons . . 9

CONCLUSION

10

ADDENDA
Addendum A

-

Statement of Defendant in Advance
of Plea of Guilty-

Addendum B

-

Transcript of Appeal

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985)

9, 10

State v. Anderson. T. > P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1990)

9

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

7

State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) . .'

1,

5

State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991)

5,

6

5,

7

State v. Price. 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992)

4,

State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810 (Utah 1994)

2

State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)

7,

8'

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052 (1984)

1, 4, 7, 8, 9

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990)

1,

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1990)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1994)

ii

2
2
1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 930059-CA

v,
Priority No.

LARRY D. PERSON

2

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for
modification of judgment following a conviction for theft, a
third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1990), in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Should this Court consider defendant's claiir of

ineffective assistance of counsel when it was not claimed in his
motion for modification of judgment?

"[O]rdinarily, [the

reviewing court] will not entertain an issue first raised on
appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances or plain
error."

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State

v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 580-81 (Utah App. 1992).
2.

Was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel

because his trial counsel did not independently confirm
defendant's two prior theft convictions?

"When . . . the claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time
on appeal, [the appellate court] resolve[s] the issue as a matter
of law."

State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah 1994).

In

order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must establish (1) that his counsel's performance
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;" and (2)
that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.

Id. at

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2064 (1984)) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann- § 76-6-412 (1990)
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this
chapter shall be punishable:
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any
robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft [.]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Larry D. Person was charged by information with third degree
felony theft in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, -412
(1990), for obtaining or exercising unauthorized control over the
property of Mervyn's Store, "to wit: shoes of a value less than
$250.00, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and because
defendant had been twice previously convicted of any theft,
robbery or burglary with intent to commit theft" (R. 1 ) .
Initially, defendant pled not guilty (R. 17). Pursuant to a
plea agreement with the State, defendant changed his plea to
guilty (R. 28-29, 31-37, 95-98) .
2

The trial court sentenced

defendant t: a term of zero to five years in the Utah State
Prison (R. •*!) . Thereafter, Defendant, pro se, filed a "Motion
for Modification of Judgment" (hereinafter "motion," R. 44-46),
which the trial court summarily denied as frivolous (R. 66), from
which defendant appeals (R. 68).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For this appeal, the pertinent facts involve:

(1) the

parties7 evident recognition of defendant's prior convictions,
used to enhance the theft charcre to a third degree felony; and
(2) the distinction between c.^ims raised in defendant's motion
from those now raised on appeal.
Preliminary to changing his plea, defendant signed a
statement (see Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of
Guilty, R. 31-37, attached at Addendum A ) .
indicated:

Defendant's statement

(1) defendant discussed with his attorney the nature

of the charge and understood the elements of the offense, i.e., a
third degree felony theft based on two prior theft convictions
(R. 31-32); (2) defendant r«ad and understood English (R. 34);
(3) defendant understood that within thirty days he could request
to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 35); and (4) that defendant had
sufficiently discussed his case with his trial counsel, with whom
he was satisfied (R. 3T).
At the plea hearing defendant acknowledged that he
understood the plea agreement and that everything had been
disclosed to the court (R. 95). Specifically, the court
confirmed that defendant understood English, that defendant had
3

been "twice previously convicted of theft, robbery or burglary
with intent to commit theft," and that defendant was knowingly
and voluntarily entering a guilty plea after having reviewed his
written statement with his trial counsel (R. 96-99).

The trial

court also informed defendant that he could move to withdraw his
plea within thirty days, but not later (R. 99).
Nearly three months L:er, defendant filed his motion for
modification (R. 44). The motion contained seven allegations of
error, none of which pertained to ineffective assistance of
counsel (R. 44-46) . Defendant appealed only from the denial of
this motion (see Notice of Appeal, R. 68). At

~> time has

defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant appeals only from the denial of his motion for
modification of judgment, whijh does not contain a challenge to
the effectiveness of his counsel, the only claim raised on
appeal.

Because defendant has failed to preserve his claim, the

Court should decline to consider it on appeal.
POINT II
Defendant fails to satisfy either prong of the Strickland
test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant claims that his trial counsel failed to independently
verify his prior convictions and thereby incompetently
recommended that he plead guilty to a third degree felony theft
charge.

However, the record is replete with defendant's
4

acknowledgment of his prior convictions.

Therefore, counsel

reasonably assumed the fact of the convictions in making his
recommendation.

Moreover, defendant has never denied the prior

convictions, moved to withdraw his guilty plea or asserted that
he would proceed to trial but for his trial counsel's alleged
ineffectiveness.

Therefore, defendant has failed to show that

the outcome of the proceeding would have been different even if
counsel had independently verified the convictions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant has failed to preserve :* s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on appeal.
11

[0] rdinarily, [the reviewing court] will not entertain an

issue first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional
circumstances or plain error."

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,

1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Pries., 837 P.2a 576, 580-81 (Utah App.
1992) -1
1

An ineffective assistance may be raised on appeal "if the
trial record is adequate to permit decision of the issue and
defendant is represented by counsel ctner than trial counsel."
State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991). However,
Humphries was a decision on certiorari to the Utah Supreme court
involving a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Thus, the defendant had no intervening opportunity to make his
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In this
case, however, defendant had such an opportunity in the trial
court, i.e., the filing -of his motion to modify the judgment. It
must be assumed that defendant intended to raise in his motion
all claims affecting his substantial rights, including
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant nowhere
suggests that circumstances prevented him from raising the
5

Both the notice of appeal (R. 68) and defendant's opening
brief specifically challenge only the trial court's denial of his
motion for modication of judgment. Appellant's Br. at 1, 2, 5,
6, 10. More particularly, defendant challenges on appeal "only
those points raised [in his motion] which bear upon of [sic]
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, there being no other
substantial arguments . . . ." Appellant's Br. at 8.
Defendant's discussion of alleged ineffective assistance asserts
only that his trial counsel failed to verify the accuracy of a
"rap sheet" referencing defendant's prior convictions.
Appellant's Br. at 9.
Defendant's motion does not include a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel (R. 44-46).2
failed to preserve his claim.

Therefore, defendant has

Defendant does not assert that

exceptional circumstances prevented him from raising an
ineffectiveness claim.

Neither does defendant allege that the

trial court committed plain error in accepting his guilty plea
without a further verification of conviction record other than

ineffectiveness claim now urged on appeal in his motion.
Therefore, the general directive regarding ineffectiveness claims
announced in Humphries should not be applied to this case.
2

Defendant claims that his motion raised the
ineffectiveness of his counsel in failing to explain the charge
and possible sentence arid that the prior convictions were not
proven in court. Appellant's Br. at 7. In fact, defendant made
clear in his memorandum in support of his motion that his
challenge concerning prior convictions related only to whether he
was represented by counsel in those prior proceedings (R. 63-64),
and that he was not claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as
to any issue (R. 49-65) .
6

the rap sheet.3

Finally*, because defendant has never moved to

withdraw his guilty plea, he is jurisdictionally barred from now
raising such motion.

Price, 837 P.2d at 581-84.

For all these

reasons this Court should not consider defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

However, even considering

defendant's claim, a cursory review shows it to be without merit.
POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT HIS TRIAL
COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT OR THAT,
BUT FOR COUNSEL'S ALLEGED ERRORS, THE RESULT
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT
In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the two-part test set out in Strickland v.
Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), in evaluating a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The defendant must

3

In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the supreme
court identified the necessary showing to establish plain error:
In general, to establish the existence
of plain error and to obtain appellee relief
from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined. . .
• If any one of these requirements is not
met, plain error is not established.
Id. at 1208-09 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Given defendant's hedging assertion that the rap sheet may
or may not have been accurate, it is obvious, at the very least,
that defendant has failed to show prejudice, i.e., that the
court's confidence in the verdict should be undermined.
7

first "identify the acts or omissions" which, under the
circumstances, "show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness."

Id. at 186. This

requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious that he
was not functioning as "counsel" as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.

Id.

Secondly, the defendant "must show that there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."

Id. 186-87.

The defendant has the

burden of proof with respect to both prongs of the Strickland
test.

Id. at 186. Defendant has failed to carry the burden with

respect to both of these parts.
A.

Trial Counsel's Acceptance of Defendant's
Prior Convictions, Without Apparent
Verification, was Reasonable.

Defendant asserts that his trial counsel erred in not
obtaining a certified transcript of his prior convictions.
Consequently, defendant argues, trial counsel relied "solely on
information furnished by the prosecutor" regarding defendant's
prior convictions.

Therefore, defendant contends, his counsel

erroneously recommended that he plead guilty to a third degree
felony.

Appellant's Br. at 9.

However, defendant cites no

authority for the proposition that counsel acted incompetently in
relying on defendant's own admissions and a "rap sheet" when

8

recommending that he plead guilty.4
Given record evidence that defendant was informed numerous
times that he was being charged with a third degree felony based
on his two previous theft convictions (R. 95, 104, 106), and the
fact that he never challenged that point, trial counsel's
reliance on the existence of the prior convictions was
reasonable.

And before accepting the guilty plea, the trial

court informed defendant that the State would h&v

to prove "that

you have been twice previously convicted of any -reft.. . ." (R.
97).

Finally, defendant himself acknowledged in his statement

that "I have been previously convicted twice of theft" (~

..2) .

In sum, trial counsel performed competently in allowing defendant
to plead guilty.
B.

Defendant has Not Shown that the
Result of the Proceeding Would Have Been
Different had Counsel Obtained Certification
of the Prior Convictions.

The second prong of Strickland, i.e., that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's un; ^ Sessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,"
Strickland 466 U.S. at 694, applies to guilty pleas. K. _ /.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370-71 (1985).
When counsel is allegedly ineffective in allowing a defendant to

4

Defendant does cite State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114
(Utah App. 1990), in which this Court reversed a trial court's
determination that the defendant had twice previously £een
convicted of theft. However, in Anderson the case went to trial,
and the State attempted to prove Anderson's prior convictions
based only on clerical notes. Id. at 1115. In this case
however, defendant nowhere denies the prior convictions.
9

plead guilty, this prejudice prong is satisfied by proof that but
for counsel's errors, the defendant would have insisted c^
proceeding to trial.

Id. 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 37^-31.

Defendant nowhere shows that he was not actually twice convicted
of burglary, theft or robbery.

Therefore, he has not shown

either that he wc^„d not have pleaded guilty to third degree
felony theft and proceeded to trial, or that the outcome of trial
would have been different had trial counsel sought certified
copies of prior convictions.

Therefore, defendant cannot succeed

on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests th^s Court
affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to modify judgment
and deny his appellate claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
In accordance with procedures concerning oral argument and
the issuance of opinions, effective January 1, 1995, the State
does not request oral argument based on this Court's prior
development of the issues raised in this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X^

day of July, 1995.
Jan Graham
Attorney General

y^
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Kenneth A. Bronston
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICA"" OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Stephen A. Laker, Attorney for Appellant, 2568 Washington Blvd.,
St 202, Ogden, Utah 84401, this 7?
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day of July, 2995.
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ADDENDUM A
Statement of Defendant in Advance of Pleas of Guilty

p. '? ° l'

PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.,
OF WEBER COUNTY
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801) 392-8247

^Co!

- ="' 0 CO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SFCOVD JUPICIAL DISTRICT
WEBER COUNTY, S^Ali " l".._

7
STATE OF UTAH,

*fc

STATEMENT C~
^VDANT IN
ADVANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. ^l(C(dOWl
L
Judge i I
I y
I

^S

Defendant•

L\.

I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of
the following facts and rights by my attorney, that I understand
said facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of
counsel in reviewing, explaining and completing this form:
1.

The nature of the charges against me have bee

- ^plained.

I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the cnarges with
my attorney, and I understand the charges and the elements of each
charge which the government is required to prove.
2.

As explained, I am charged with crimes in Weber County as

follows:
Crimg

7kft
P

Class or
P^gree

Statutory Penalty

3dQon
up-^f/or
I P . cco*ft^
031

STATE OF UTAH vs.
Statement by Defendant in
Advance of Plea of Guilty
Criminal No.

3.

The possibility of entering a plea of guilty to the

charges has been discussed with the prosecutor as follows:
Class or
Pegjreg

crime

4.

Statutory penalty

/

I understand that the elements of the offenses I am

pleading guilty to are:—--7 L

I

\

\

Jmt -4 -went vdcuu^Jjf *i> \
{O'^i w^ (jj ( T t W r Q & ^ 1 ^ 4 A 0 T* ~rv\4 \M.

lOortfv fvjfr^. 6-?^ ' ' - L ^ ^
5.

^ ^

I know that: I can be represented by an attorney at every

stage of the proceeding, and I know that if I cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed to represent me.
6.

I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty," and I

know that if I do plead "not guilty," I can persist in that plea.
7.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and that

if I were to stand trial by a jury:
a.
I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every
stage of the proceeding.
b.
I have a right to see and observe the witnesses who
testify against me.

03:

STATE OF UTAH vs.
Statement by Defendant in
Advance of Plea of Guilty
Criminal No,

c.
My attorney can cross-e* -nine all witnesses who
testify against me.
d.
I can call sue: witnesses as I desire, and I can
obtain subpoenas to require the attendance and testimony of
those witnesses. If I cannot afford to pay ine witness and
mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them.
e.
I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do
not have to testify at any trial.
f.
If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told
that no inference adverse to me may be drawn from my failure
to testify.
g.
The government must prove each and every element of
the offenses charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt.h.

A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict

me.
i.
If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I
cannot affor the cost of such an appeal, the government will
pay the cc. .3 of the appeal including the services cf
appointed counsel.
8.

Under a plea of guilty, the^ vill not be a trial of any

kind, and I am waiting my rights listed in the previous paragraph
and admitting t -

I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of

guilty is entered.
9.

There is no appellate review of any lawful sentence

imposed under a plea of guilty.
10.

No agreements have been reached and no representations

have been made to me as to what the sentence will be.
11.

I know that under the laws of Utah, the possible maximum

sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to the
3

033

STATE OF UTAH vs.
Statement by Defendant in
Advance of Plea of Guilty
Criminal No.

charge identified on page two of this agreement, are set out in
paragraph three above.

I also know that if I am on probation,

parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense for which I have
been convicted or plead guilty, my plea in the present action may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12.

I know that under a plea of guilty, the judge may ask me

questions about the offense to which the plea is entered.
13.

The only plea^agreemeift which has been entered into with'

the government is: ^ ) £ ] 7 ^

r>v (A^ &**& \ AU^A
14.

^[[

{^

^

W

(

#4~

S^^Udu

(p\k*i ,

I have a rignt to asx rne Court any questions I wish to

ask concerning my rights, or about these proceedings and the plea.
*

*

*

I make the following representations to the Court:
1.

I am

7 y years of age. My education consists of Z-•—

years. /£ can/pannot read and understand English.
2.

JJo threats or promises of any sort have been made to me

to induce me or to persuade me to enter this plea.
3.

No one has told me that I would receive probation or any

other form of leniency because of my plea.

031

STATE OF UTAH vs.
Statement by Defendant in
Advance of Plea of Guilty
Criminal No.

4.

I understand that I may request to withdraw a plea of

guilty within 30 days of entry of the plea, but if said request is
hot made within 30 days I forfeit this right.

A motion to

Withdraw a plea of guilty will only be granted upon good cause and
is within the discretion of the Court.
5.

I have discussed this case and this plea with my lawyer

fcs much as I wish to.
6.

I am satisfied with my lawyer.

7.

My decision to enter this plea was made after full and

Careful thought, with t: e ad\_ce of counsel, and with a full
Understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case
and the consequences of the plea. I was not under the influence of
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when tne decision to enter the
plea was made and I am not now unqier the influence of any drugs,
dedication or intoxicants.
8.

I have no mental reservations concerning the plea.

DATED this 30^day

of *&f%

- , 1992.

£^<I <T>^,

035
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Advance of Plea of Guilty
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I certify that I have discussed this statement with the
Defendant; that I have fully explained her/his rights and believe
that he/she is knowingly and voluntarily entering the plea with
full knowledge of her/his legal rights and that there is a factual
basis for the plea.
DATED this j ? ^dav of

Sff

, 1992./
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

I certify that I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant
in Advance of Plea cf Guilty and that said statement correctly
reflects the plea negotiations of the parties.
DATED this 36

day of>JL-|e*^4v', 1992.

(^v
DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY

03G

STATE OF UTAH vs.
Statement by Defendant in
Advance of Plea of Guilty
Criminal No.

QPPEP
The signature of the Defendant was acknowledged

in the

presence of the undersigned Judge.
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement by
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, the court finds the
Defendant's plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is
ordered that Defendant's plea of "gui'-y" to the charge(s) set
forth in tne agreement be accepted and entered.
DONE in Court this

day of

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:
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ADDENDUM B
T r a n s c r i p t on Appeal

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR WEBEF ^UNTY

THE STATE 0? UTAH,
Case No. 921900449
Plaintiff
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
•\sLARRY D. PERSON,
Defendant

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above er.t.

r

d matter came on

for hearing before the Hon. MICHAEL J. GLASMANN, Judge of the
above entitled Court on September 30, 19°2.
WHEREUPON the following proceedings were

and the

following testimony was adduced, to wit:

A p p e a r a n c e s :
WILLIAM F. DAINES, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff;
ROBERT L. FROERER, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant.
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COURT OF APPEALS

CO

THE COURT:
0449.

State of Utah vs. Larry D. Person, case

Time for Pre-Trial, and our trial having been set for

October the 9th.
MR. FROERER:

Your Honor, we have a negotiated

settlement of this matter.
guilty to the charge.

Mr. Person is going to plead

The State, through Mr. Decaria, is

going to make no sentencing recommendation, though he does
reserve the right to comment on Mr. Person's prior record.
THE COURT:

Anything else?

MR. FROERER:
THE COURT:
MR. DAINES:
THE COURT:

That's it.
Is that the State's understanding?
That's correct, your Honor.

Mr. Person, you have heard that

representation, that you are going to plead guilty as charged
to the third degree felony, theft.

That the State agrees to

make no recommendation as to what your sentence should be, but)
does reserve the right to comment on your previous criminal
record if they so choose.

You understand that that is the

plea bargain?
MR. PERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, I do.
Is there anything else that's been

represented to you that has not been disclosed here?
MR. PERSON;
THE COURT:

No.
All right.

Do you have a clear mind

today?
2
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MR. PERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, I do.
Are you under the influence of any

alcohol or drugs?
MR. PERSON:

No.

THE COURT:

A:

you under the influence of any

medication that would cloud your thinking?
MR. PERSON:
THE COURT:

No.
Do you speak, read and write the Englisfcj

language?
MR. PERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
You understand that you are entitled to

a trial on this third degree felony, and that could be to a
Judge or to a Jury.

If the trial were to a Jury it would be

an eight member Jury.

And before you could be convicted, each)

member of the Jury would have to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt of your guilt.
MR. PERSON;
THE COURT:

You understand that?

Yes.
Do you understand that you have the

right to confront the witnesses the State would call against
you, including cross-examination of those witnesses.

That you|

have the right to compel witnesses to come here to court and
testify on your behalf?
MR. PERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Do you understand that if you plead

guilty, and do not have a trial, you will be giving up your
3
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right to appeal from anything that might have occurred during
that trial?
MR. PERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
In this case you are presumed innocent.

The State has the burden of proving your guilty, as I have
said, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State has alleged, and

must prove in this case, that you committed a theft.

That yovj

obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property
of Mervynfs Shoes, to wit, shoes, of a value less than $250.00)
with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.

And that you

have been twice previously convicted of any theft, robbery ;or
burglary with intent to commit theft.
Is that correct, Mr. Daines?
MR. DAINES:
THE COURT:

Yes, thatfs correct, your Honor.
Do you understand that those are the

elements the State would have to prove against you?
MR. PERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, I do.
Are you pleading guilty in this case

because you in fact committed the theft?
MR. PERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, I am.
Tell the Court what happened briefly if

you would.
MR. PERSON:

Well, I walked in and put on a pair of

shoes and walked out.
THE COURT:

All right.

Do you understand that the
4
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1
2

maximum penalty for the third degree felony is zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison and up to $5,000.00 in fines?

3

MR. PERSON:

4

Yes, I do.

THE COURT:

You understand that nc^withstanding

5

whatfs been said or represented to you, that it is up to the

6

Court to sentence you.

7

maximum penalty?

And the Court can sentence you to the

8

MR. PERSON:

Yes.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

time to think about this, or to consult with your attorney?

11

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

No, I donft.

MR. PERSON;

12
13

At this time do you need any morej

THE COURT:

As to the third degree felony, theft,

alleged to have been committed on May 17, 1992, how do you
plead?
MR. PERSON:

Guilty.

MR. FROERER:
THE COURT:

Pardon?

MR. FROERER:
THE COURT:

I do have a statement, your Honor.

We do have e

Very good.

latement.

Ii you will approach the

Bench, Mr. Froerer.
Your attorney, Mr. Person, has provided roe with a

22

Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty.

Has your]

23

attorney been over that with you?
24

MR. PERSON:
25

THE COURT:

Yes, he has.
He explained i t t o you?
51
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9

MR. PERSON:

Yes, he did.

THE COURT:
Larry Person.

It appears to contain the signature of

Is that your signature on page five?

MR. PERSON;
THE COURT:

Yes, it is.
All right.

The Court will find that yovj

knowingly and voluntarily entered your plea of guilty.
I want to advise you, as I have previous Defendants, that)
you have 30 days from today within which to bring a Motion to
Withdraw your Plea of Guilty.

It doesnft mean the Court will

10

grant it, but if you don't bring it within that 30 days, it is|

11

not timely.

Do you understand that?

12

MR. PERSON:

13

THE COURT:

14

for sentencing.

Yes, I do.
All right.

The Probation Office looking for three weeks?)

15

PROBATION OFFICER:

16

MR. FROERER:

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

This matter needs to be set

Yes, your Honor.

Your Honor, he is requesting sooner

than that.
THE COURT:

Let me ask this question:

Do we have

any—have you ever been on probation before this Court
previous to this?
MR. PERSON:
THE COURT:
MR. PERSON:

Yes, I have.
How long ago?
Quite a while ago.

I have been on

parole, though.
MR. DAINES:

Thatfs what partially complicates this
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situation.

Mr. Funk informs me in many instances it is

actually going to take longer to do a probation report on a
person with his type of record than it might a person without
a record.
THE COURT: Mr. Person, I recommend that we give theitj
time to do a full report.

That could be to your benefit for

the Court to have a full report of your background.
So we will set sentencing for the 21st of October.

And

that will be at 2:00 p.m.
I will indicate to you that *v

<-^->~

take into

account the time that you have served at tne time of sentence.
MR. PERSON:
MR. FROERER:

Thank you.
Thank you.
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